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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses the relation between local ownership in a selection of 
Swedish aid projects and the manner in which aid is provided. It addresses analytical 
problems of defining ownership for organizations and methodological problems in the 
empirical investigation. Ownership by organizations is interpreted as a metaphor that 
requires a behavioral interpretation when applied to organizations. To understand 
ownership of projects implies distinguishing between projects elements such as 
inputs, outputs, objectives and processes in different phases of the project. Where 
three parties are involved in a project, namely the local organization, the consultant 
and the aid provider, multiple ownership is the outcome. Key findings of the study are 
firstly that local ownership cannot be created by other parties, but can be enhanced 
and facilitated. Secondly, multiple ownership can take the form of co-ownership when 
individual parties fruitfully cooperate along different incentive structures to achieve 
project success. Although focusing on technical assistance projects, the issues 
discussed in this paper will also be helpful for analyzing ownership issues in other 
project, as well as programs and policies. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyses the relation between local ownership in a selection of 
Swedish aid projects and the manner in which aid is provided. It addresses analytical 
problems of defining ownership for organizations and methodological problems in the 
empirical investigation. The empirical study from which this paper draws covers 38 
technical assistance projects in 7 countries around the world with differing socio-
economic profiles and environments for development cooperation.
1 Although 
focusing on projects, the issues discussed in this paper will also be helpful for 
analyzing ownership issues in programs and policies. 
Technical assistance projects are particularly interesting for analyzing the 
question of local ownership since the output consists of knowledge (know-how and 
know-why), which by definition must be owned to be pertinent and successful. Yet, 
individual employee ownership and organizational ownership are different things. A 
major finding of this study is that local ownership cannot be created by donor 
interventions. Rather, careful selection of organizations and conditions and content of 
cooperation can enhance and build on existing ownership of projects by local 
organizations. In addition, ownership of projects can be shared between donors, 
consultants and local organizations: thus co-ownership can be achieved. Co-
ownership is promoted if different incentive systems facing the various cooperating 
parties induce each to work for project success defined by overlapping criteria. Thus, 
an overall conclusion emerges: given the right conditions for and content of projects, 
good aid practice is possible through a regard for ownership. Co-ownership of 
projects is possible as a non-zero sum game as a result of a successful aid effort where 
cooperating parties respect the autonomy of others and capacity-building is achieved. 
As an initial, intuitive definition, the concept of ownership of a project by an 
organization can be loosely understood as capturing the degree of responsibility that 
the organization has and shows for bringing the project to a successful result. 
Apart from being a key factor in achieving project success, local ownership in 
aid projects is also considered by aid-providers and aid-receivers alike as an end in 
itself. To the extent that ownership is both a means and an end of development 
                                                 
1The work was carried out as a Sida evaluation in Botswana, Egypt, Guatemala, Lithuania, Mongolia, 
Mozambique and Ukraine. The 7 reports, published as monographs, are available on http://www. 
sida.se. 
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cooperation, a justifiable question to ask is what influence a particular project 
planning approach or aid modality can have on local ownership. 
Whereas the above statements have a great deal of intuitive appeal, further 
analysis below reveals the complexities involved in concepts and contexts that partly 
arise from applying human concepts to organizations, and partly from using singular 
concepts for multifaceted entities as in the case of projects and aid. Complexities in 
contexts arise from the aid context itself including its inequalities in terms of 
resources, the sometimes ambivalent objectives surrounding aid projects, and from the 
cultural differences prevailing between the parties (not partners per se) involved in aid 
projects. 
Aid projects according to numerous evaluations the world over typically have 
a low success rate and are plagued by a large number of problems in their various 
phases. Amongst these problems, sustainability of project results is a major one, when 
even projects that were successfully implemented do not survive the transfer to 
normal routine, beyond the period with the specific project status. The local 
organization that was ‘helped’ does not sustain the project results. This lack of 
sustainability effort on the part of a local organization is often seen as a first line of 
explanation of project failure. Strong local ownership, it is believed, can contribute to 
sustainability. In many, perhaps most, technical assistance projects everywhere, as in 
the case of the aid approach analyzed in this paper, three main actors are strongly 
present: the aid organization, the consultant, and the local organization, each with 
their own interests in the project, viewing and defining the project from their own 
perspective. However the importance of each these roles can vary, in individual 
projects and perhaps sets of projects classified according by aid organization. 
Projects in the private sector s similarly have a financier, a consultant and a 
(local) organization. The mechanisms that exist to coordinate the activities of these 
parties in this sector towards mutual satisfaction of objectives comprise: profit 
motives, competition, long term survival, and contracts, supported by market 
institutions. What are the types of incentives and forms of motivation that shape the 
dynamics of the interaction in this aid context where parties other than the local 
organization define and control what is best for the local organization? There is here a 
big difference between the aid context and the private sector context to examine. 
Additional factors complicate matters further when ownership is considered in 
the aid compared with the private sector. Aid organizations certainly have the means 
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in terms of resources and personnel; they also have the intentions (aid-driven or 
otherwise) in terms of their organizational objectives and individual motivation of 
their staff. Private sector organizations in both donor and recipient countries have 
developed to accommodate this aid-financed part of the market.  Networks of national 
and international NGOs channel the finance and motivations for ‘helping the other’ 
towards certain destinations. In the process of organizational development, 
dependencies grow on both sides, making aiding and recipient organizations/ 
individuals increasingly self-interested and (aid-) market oriented. Projects become 
supply-driven, both by the need to have projects as well as by the assumption of 
knowing ‘what is good for them’ (as well as for the donor themselves). The result is 
an awkward mixture of self-interest, paternalism, and genuine ethical concerns, in 
various degrees and combinations expressed and hidden at individual and 
organizational levels. 
The end-result is that project will have multiple owners, each of whom will 
pull it into the direction of its own objectives, which often and ironically – on the part 
of the donor and consultant – include the perceived objectives of the local 
organization. This multiplicity is complex. It involves organizations and individuals in 
networks of sometimes contradicting interests, objectives and intentions embedded in 
a context where good intentions can turn out as bad intentions (as in paternalism) and 
so-perceived bad intentions (in the limited sense of not being aid-driven) can have 
good consequences (where profit making consultants deliver good results). 
Why is ownership the solution? With multiple ownership identified as the 
problem, the solution of local ownership reads like only a cheap solution. It sounds 
like denying all the complexities of the aid context. Yet, seriously trying to appreciate 
multiple ownership as a matter of fact in such aid situations can be productive: it 
becomes possible to study the conditions, forms and types of aid delivery that would 
reduce the potential for conflict between the objectives of the various parties with 
regard to the project and shift the balance of power and ownership towards the local 
organization. 
Given that in a private market context, ownership by organizations of their 
projects is less problematic, with one way in which this particular aspect of the aid 
context can be adjusted being the creation of a quasi-market context. Many donors 
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require cost sharing as a token of local ownership, with legal contracts drawn up 
specifying rights and duties accordingly.
2 The resulting aid modality can be called 
Contract Financed Cooperation. Restricting it to technical assistance projects this 
becomes called Contract Financed Technical Cooperation (CFTC; in Swedish: KTS). 
The structure of this paper is as follows. After this introductory section, the 
second section develops the ideas, concepts and distinctions with regard to 
organizational ownership; the third discusses the aid intervention in terms of its 
specific modalities that might influence local ownership; the fourth summarizes our 
approach to the empirical work in the full study; the fifth section presents its main 
empirical findings; finally the sixth discusses wider implications. 
 
 
2  OWNERSHIP: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES 
As referred to above, an intuitive understanding of ownership may relate 
immediately to individual ownership. A step to a more critical analysis of the concept 
of ownership for organizations must discuss how the ‘individual’ meaning transforms 
when discussing ownership of processes, project inputs and outputs by organizations. 
 
2.1 Individual  ownership 
The notion of an individual’s ownership of an object may be the least 
problematic.
3 Individual ownership has many dimensions, including (i) economic 
(such as assets and liabilities); (ii) legal (liability, property, exclusion); (iii) criminal 
(theft, appropriation); (iv) psychological (identification, commitment, responsibility, 
desire); and (v) political (power relations, processes of appropriation, conflict). 
In the context of aid, the motivational aspect of ownership (in relation to 
project success) seems to be best understood by referring to psychological 
dimensions. Society enables possible ownership by cultural, and the state by legal, 
institutions. Institutions have developed and are maintained in relation to all these 
                                                 
2However, going to court is not often invoked in case of conflict. After all, aid is not a private market 
situation in that sense and retains its soft edges. Moreover, in one case where there was a conflict that 
could not be solved amiably, the local organization was reluctant to go to an international court because 
of its lack of experience. 
3However, the emphasis in market economies on private ownership and related property rights that 
arguably is typical in western individualistic culture contrasts with the ideas of communal ownership, 
or no ownership, as these may feature in many non-western cultures Thus, the question arises whether 
just a single notion of ownership is understood and valued equally in recipient as in donor countries.  
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aspects. However, without the psychological dimensions being operational ownership 
will not be asserted, even when the means to do so are available. Possible ownership 
does not automatically turn into actual ownership. 
 
2.2  Active and passive ownership 
Still on the plane of individuals (organizations are introduced in the next 
section), the concept of local ownership may be analyzed also in terms of passive and 
active ownership orientations. Active ownership can be dynamically defined in terms 
of attitudes taken towards the project elements (objects, objectives, processes and 
results) and the actions that are undertaken accordingly: the desire to reach a project 
outcome will translate into an attempt to control processes that hopefully lead to the 
realization of this outcome. 
This distinction has three implications. First, this idea of active ownership 
brings into focus the analysis of other possible actors, such as government aid officers 
or the consultant, who can influence the project outcome. Each of these actors may 
see the same project differently from their own perspective, including as defined 
along the lines of the interests of their own that they may have in the various activities 
that follow from the project. Where their perceptions of the importance of these 
project activities differ, the possibility arises of testing for and estimating active 
ownership of each of these actors through recording their attempts to influence the 
course of project processes and each others’ behavior. Then, ownership of the project 
can be approached with respect to all actors involved, rather than just the local 
organization. This conceptualization allows for analyzing multiple and mutual 
ownership and from there on concepts of partnership seen in relation to inter-personal 
and inter-organizational relations. 
Second, most technical assistance projects involve transfer of knowledge. In a 
project comprising training or technology transfer, the transfer of knowledge is its 
main objective. In other types of projects where the consultant’s main role is that of 
professional advisor, the  transfer  of  knowledge is more indirect and comes as a  rule 
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mostly in the form of transfer of tacit knowledge.
4 However, in each of these cases 
there is a common requirement: that the information transferred becomes personal 
knowledge (see footnote 4) through a process of individual acquisition by the 
receiving person. 
Third, owning the project also implies the possibility of owning the processes 
that take place in planning and managing the project. Where many of these relate to 
various market institutions, owning the capability to deal with these becomes an 
essential part of owning project processes. 
In conclusion, then, both passive and active forms of ownership need to be 
established by an active act on the side of the recipient at the level of the concrete 
output, of managing the concrete processes, and of dealing with the pertaining market 
institutions. Ownership relates to all three areas. Perhaps with the exception of the 
project output, the other two aspects involve the possibility of multiple ownership. As 
for the project output, i.e. embodied knowledge, ownership has to become personal 
(or organizational) regarding achieving of project objectives, leaving space for other 
parties to own their own but similar knowledge. 
 
2.3 Organizational  ownership 
The discussion above was conducted by referring to interaction between 
individuals where attitudinal concepts can be appropriately applied. When focusing 
the discussion on organizations, the challenge becomes to find behavioral equivalents 
of individual with organizational behavior. This shifts the focus to considering actions 
and activities. An organization intensively and consistently undertaking activities that 
lead to the realization of an objective may be described as committed to, or owning, 
it.. Thus, such commitment becomes shorthand for intensity and consistency of 
activities undertaken to reach a certain objective. Any ‘measurement’ of 
‘commitment’ then must take place at the behavioral level. Yet what matters to the 
realization of the objective is whether the activities are undertaken or not, not that 
they are labeled as either ‘commitment’ or ‘ownership’. In  this  reference  and  sense, 
                                                 
4In brief, the term tacit knowledge refers to forms of knowledge that can only be transferred by close 
interaction between the owner of it and the potential receiver when performing the function for which 
the knowledge is required. The term ‘personal knowledge’ emphasizes the fact that such (and other) 
knowledge has to be appropriated before it can put be put to use. Both terms originate from Polanyi 
(1962). 
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therefore, these terms can be viewed as metaphors. 
Organizations work (or not) through the linking of ideas and interests on the 
part of the organization to those of their members and other individuals. This equally 
applies to projects in organizations. Organizations have formal mission statements, 
organograms and the like to prescribe and direct their activities. Projects have goals 
and objectives laid down in project documents. Each has too its greater or lesser 
extent charismatic or otherwise personally influential supporters and opponents, and 
capable and committed members. In actuality, therefore, the attributes of 
organizations, projects and individuals interpenetrate constructively (or not) in 
particular responsibilities and activities. 
It is in this actuality that the rewards and incentives that organizations 
formally provide can work to steer their members to achieve the objectives set for 
projects. The organization behaves as if it is committed because it develops the same 
type of activities (and metaphors) that a committed person would develop. But to 
assign psychological properties to an organization would be fallacious. ‘Commitment’ 
we understand in this paper as just a shorthand expression for a particular and relevant 
organizational activity or activities. These activities can be observed, and their 
relations with project objectives analyzed. 
It can therefore be argued that in one sense and on one level that relation 
between activities and project results does not require mediation by concepts such as 
ownership, commitment and responsibility. Inferences about the interior 
psychological make-up of individuals ought not to be confused with the observable 
attributes of organizations that are exhibited in their activities. Again this is why, 
when referred to organizations, concepts such as ownership, commitment and 
responsibility are metaphors. 
 
2.4 Ownership  of  projects 
Various project elements can be distinguished: material and immaterial inputs 
and outputs, project activities and processes occurring in phases (related to the project 
cycle), and project objectives. Any individual project may be seen as made up of a 
number of processes that are set in motion, guided and coordinated in order to 
transform material and non-material inputs into certain material and non-material 
outputs or results contributing to the achievement of specific objectives. Non-material 
results include for instance transfer of knowledge and institutional development. 
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A working definition of ownership therefore requires that some key 
distinctions are made to facilitate its use: ownership of material inputs and outputs 
(i.e. objects), of non-material inputs and outputs (particularly, in the case of technical 
assistance projects, technical knowledge), and ownership of objectives and of 
processes. Ownership has different meanings in each of these references. Prescriptive 
meanings of ‘ownership’ tend to be more honorific and metaphorical as compared 
with descriptive meanings. 
In relation to a project’s material inputs or outputs, it is easy to indicate who 
owns what and when. Ownership of objects can be equated with property rights. 
Property rights are, however, of course not absolute. They are limited by legislation 
and agreements, for instance between the local organization and the donor. 
Ownership of material inputs, and the transfer of such ownership, is in 
principle a trivial affair, clearly defined by the terms and conditions of the aid 
relationship, which is not particularly interesting for this study. It may, on the other 
hand, be pointed out that, in a project where a consultant provides knowledge inputs, 
the transfer of these inputs to the local organization is done differently in training 
(where the transfer is direct) and in consultancy (where the knowledge is transferred 
in the form of the consultant’s advice). These differences have implications for the 
ease with which the local organization can appropriate the knowledge in question. 
Ownership by an organization of the knowledge outputs in technical assistance 
projects requires the mediation of individuals and the associated individual acquisition 
of knowledge. In other words, the organization acquires knowledge to the extent that 
this becomes personal knowledge of some of its individual members, who then put it 
to the use of the organization. 
Ownership of an objective  may be equated with a commitment to that 
objective, as can be ascertained by examining the documents as to organizational 
priorities and the like. Whether this ownership can be translated into ownership of 
processes (see next) depends on the local partners’ capacity, and particularly its 
organizational competence. Commitment and organizational competence are therefore 
pre-requisites for ownership of objectives. 
For this paper, ownership of project processes is taken to mean the assumption 
of responsibility for project formulation, implementation and control, varying at 
different stages of the project cycle. A local organization may have the necessary 
competence to analyze its own situation and formulate projects that respond to its 
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main needs, and yet lack the competence to take full responsibility for the 
management of these projects. It may then be forced to rely on the consultant for such 
management. The consultant may also mediate between the local organization and the 
aid provider whenever necessary. 
Control, implementation, and management are not entirely equivalent terms. 
Management may, to some practical extent, presume or subsume both control and 
implementation, but it connotes also something qualitatively different: committed 
decision-making about strategic choices for example of resource allocation. In the aid 
context, it connotes negotiation with the aid provider about the rules and possible 
variations of resource allocation and reporting. 
All the definitions of ownership given above are compatible with ownership 
by an individual, an organization, or a group of organizations or individuals. As to 
who owns what in the aid-recipient country, it is easy for instance to conceive of a 
project in which the project itself is owned by a local organization, while the 
objectives are co-owned by that organization and other stakeholders, including certain 
government departments. Project outputs are owned by the project owner and may 
also be owned (or used, or enjoyed) by other project beneficiaries or stakeholders. 
 
 
3  ATTRIBUTES OF PROJECT AID MODALITY 
Several of the specific attributes of the aid modality discussed below are to a 
large extent common to the practice of many aid providers. This implies therefore that 
probably there is more general relevance to be sought of the specifics of our case 
study which are limited to the Swedish Contract Financed Technical Cooperation 
(CFTC), regarding the importance of contracts in defining the (quasi-market) relation 
between the local organization, the consultant and the aid provider.
5 There are 
however more attributes, both explicit and informal, that characterize this Swedish aid 
form. The formal attributes are: 
 
                                                 
5The Swedish acronym as noted before is KTS. From the point of view of perfect markets, contracts are 
of course non-market institutions to correct market inefficiencies. From a more general perspective, 
contracts are typical of real life market arrangements. The emphasis is on the difference between the 
aid context (with an arrangement between aid provider and local organization) and the market context 
(with an arrangement between a consultant and the local organization, financed by the aid provider). 
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(a) Formal contracts are signed between the consultant and local organization. In 
theory, the aid provider only pays for the services of the consultant, but the 
contract and the procedures leading up to the contract are managed by the 
local organization. In addition there is a signed project agreement with the 
donor. 
(b) An affirmed hands-off role on the part of the aid provider in the project 
planning process, regarding either or both actual project planning and the 
absence in the project objectives of the agenda of the aid provider. 
(c) Projects are demand-driven in the sense that the initiative has to come from the 
local organization or must at least feature high in the priority listing of the 
local organization. 
(d) All projects in this aid modality were in the area of technical assistance, 
paying only for consultancy services. Aid money was not available for 
hardware support. 
(e) The local organization shows its commitment to the project by cost-sharing of 
up to 50 percent of the costs of the consultant and depending on the financial 
situation of the local organization. 
(f)  Project duration is limited to a period of about one year. 
(g) Competent local organizations are eligible for this type of support as they are 
deemed to be able to select and handle the consultant through the contract, and  
(h) Consultants are selected from the aid-providing country (Sweden in this case) 
on the basis of tendering whenever applicable. 
In actual practice, most projects visited also involved (a) cooperation with a 
professional local organization, (b) a succession of contract financed projects which 
while each was indeed of limited duration added up to a longer period of cooperation, 
conditioned by positive evaluation, (c) presence of strong leadership of the project in 
the local organization (the project champion), (d) focus on strengthening core-
competences of the local organization. These apparently informal criteria turned out 
to be important for project success. 
 
 
4 METHODOLOGICAL  APPROACH 
Given the complexities of the concepts involved in a possible relationship 
between the attributes of project aid modality and local ownership, our 
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operationalization first drew up a list of open-ended questions, with which to trace the 
involvement of the local organization in the various planning stages of the project, to 
probe the nature and effects of the various attributes and the perceptions of key 
informants on the role of the other parties and on the manner in which attributes  
influenced behavior. Similar questions were used for guiding interviews with the 
relevant consultant organizations and Swedish aid workers in the head office (Sida) in 
Stockholm and locally at Swedish embassies. 
In addition, a more formal list of qualitative and where possible quantitative 
indicators was developed of different aspects of local ownership and aid attributes. 
This both facilitated team discussion while at the same time complicating it, given the 
derived nature of indicators in relation to what they are intended to measure and the 
possibility of different perceptions both on the side of interviewees and interviewers.
6 
It also provided a prop for comparing projects in and between countries. 
The first country case study, Lithuania, with 8 projects, was used to test and 
refine this approach. Over most of the time there, all four members of that country 
team (the three core team members for the evaluation as a whole, and a Lithuanian) 
were present in each interview. Intensive discussion followed to see whether the 
knowledge thus acquired by the team members individually could be used to reach a 
consensus on the necessary judgments required. In subsequent country studies the 




5  FINDINGS OF OWNERSHIP IN THE CASE STUDIES 
5.1 Co-Ownership 
A first main overall finding is that a substantial majority of the projects studied 
appeared to have achieved rather high levels of local ownership. Ownership of 
knowledge outputs was very high, indicating that, by the criterion of knowledge 
transmission and knowledge development, most of the projects studied may be 
characterized  as successful or even very successful. Ownership of objectives was also 
                                                 
6See Guimarães, Apthorpe, Valk (2002) for a more elaborate discussion of these issues, the list of open-
ended questions and the definition of the indicators. 
7With the exception of Mongolia, where consistency was achieved by careful instruction. 
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very high, indicating a strong commitment to project objectives on the part of the 
local organization. 
Ownership of project processes, both formulation and implementation, tended 
to be shared with the Swedish consultants and, sometimes also Sida.
8 Local 
organizations valued such shared responsibility more highly than exclusive 
responsibility for project processes, which is a sign and a consequence of good co-
operation with the consultant. It was this finding in particular that led this study to 
introduce the term co-ownership, to characterize such situations of shared ownership. 
Co-ownership may also cover the relationship with the donor. Co-ownership can exist 
not only in relation to processes, but also in relation to objectives and to knowledge. 
With the help of this co-ownership idea, a different picture of a CFTC project 
begins to emerge: one where two organizations, each with its own motivations, are 
brought together by Sida financing and by a particular set of incentives to achieve 
certain common objectives. At the outset of this co-operation, the respective parties’ 
degree of ownership of the knowledge that is the object of the co-operation is very 
different, as also may be their technical and organizational capacity. Through their co-
ownership of the objectives, the parties become co-owners of the project processes; 
with the responsibility that each takes for those processes being a function principally 
of their capacity. 
As the project continues, the local organization’s knowledge and 
organizational capacity increases, and so does its assumption of responsibility for the 
project processes, particularly regarding formulation and implementation. If the 
project is long enough, a genuine partnership may (and often does) develop between 
the two organizations. In this partnership, each partner does what it can do best to 
achieve the common goals. By the end of the project, the local organization becomes 
the owner of a body of knowledge, acquired with the Swedish consultant’s help, this 
acquisition being one of the project’s main objectives. In several cases the relationship 
is expected to continue through longer-term arrangements such as twinning, while in 
others it ends with the project, but may also be prolonged into other projects. 
                                                 
8Sida’s role was often stronger in financial matters and evaluation involving the risk of reducing local 
ownership. 
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5.2 National  context 
Is CFTC an aid modality that is suitable for all countries? One could argue that 
reliance on quasi-market forms of aid would thrive better in countries with more 
developed markets, better institutions and less corruption. The Botswana and 
Mozambique country study finds that differences in the national context of 
Mozambique as compared with Botswana are indeed relevant in the sense that 
competent organizations are fewer in Mozambique than in Botswana and that more 
emphasis needs to be placed on, amongst others, the selectivity of the project planning 
attributes. Figure 1 below provides an overview of these findings. 
Figure 1 
Adjustment of project approach to context 
Botswana 
–  High quality aid management 
–  National ownership 
–  High income levels 
–  Many Competent organizations 
–  Low level of corruption 
Mozambique 
–  Lower capability of aid 
management 
–  Donor driven development 
–  Low income levels 
–  Few competent organizations 
–  High level of corruption 
 
Adjustment in project approach: 
(1)  greater care in checking competence of local organization and demand-driven 
nature of projects 
(2)  longer term relations 
(3) shorter  phases 
(4)  more dedicated development-oriented consultants 
(5)  focus on earlier phases of core-technical and organizational development 
(6) less  Sida-conditionality 
(7)  lower degree of  cost-sharing 
 
The Guatemala study reports on the relative independence of its findings from 
national context. In contrast, the Egypt study reports the penetration of the influence 
of the national context through and through. This divergence is, however, partly 
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definitional. The latter study puts a heavy emphasis on defining ‘national context’ to 
include the way in which the world of foreign aid is integrated into it (in the 
perspective of the local organization). Interestingly, despite what is said about Egypt 
being a country spoiled for choice when it comes to aid, this sense of power is not felt 
at the project level. For example, cost-sharing is on the whole accepted as 
conditionality – however petty or irksome – despite the presumed possibility of 
approaching other donors who do not apply it, or who apply it differently. 
In other words, the key question appears to be, not whether a country is more 
or less suitable, but whether in that particular national context a competent local 
organization can exist. If such a local organization does exist, the practical importance 
of the national context decreases. Demand-driven and competent local organizations 
then become more important selection criteria than the national context and its 
suitability. 
 
5.3  Project modality, the context and ownership 
For the ‘chemistry’ described above to function, certain conditions must be 
fulfilled. This was largely achieved by the application of the explicit and informal 
attributes of the project modality, an application which needs to be flexible in order to 
take into account (and in some cases compensate for) the context and the diversity of 
situations that may arise. Sida applied these attributes flexibly and pragmatically, 
paying attention to both the broad context and the specific situation of the local 
organization, not mechanistically and legalistically. Thus these attributes of the 
project modality are at best guidelines or ideal requisites, not to be theorized about too 
much, just applied wherever practicable, not necessarily all to be applied at once, and 
so forth.
9
How, then, do these attributes ‘work’? The restriction of CFTC to technical 
assistance  (with no significant material assistance) removes a potential source of 
distraction, allowing the co-operation to focus on knowledge development and 
transmission from the outset. The donor’s insistence on demand-driven projects (not 
just in the formal sense but in the sense that these are projects  that  satisfy  a  strategic 
                                                 
9That neither the local organization nor the Swedish Consultant may see this in the same way is, of 
course, another finding of this study. The triangle of relations that is at the heart of technical assistance 
projects is made up of very different interests and perspectives as well as shared results-oriented values. 
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need of the local organization, e.g. by focusing on the local organization’s core 
competencies), ensures that the local organization owns the project objectives from 
early on, a necessary condition for the project to function well. Cost-sharing is often 
imposed as a condition to make sure that the local organization does own the project’s 
objectives and wants the knowledge concerned enough to be willing to pay for it (but 
as we have seen this does not always work very well). The local organization must 
also be competent enough to be able to acquire the technical knowledge that is at the 
focus of the co-operation, and to be able to assume and exercise some responsibility 
for the project. The local organization’s capabilities tend to grow as the project 
proceeds; but if they are too low at the beginning, the project risks to fail, and 
financing will be refused. More often than not, the local organization is a professional 
organization  where cross-cultural communication between consultants and 
professionals of the local organization is facilitated by professional language and 
standards. The local organization usually places a project champion with sufficient 
authority  in charge of the project, this being both a reflection of the importance 
attached to it as well as an important instrument for the local organization to realize its 
potential with regard to the project.
10
But these attributes are also applied flexibly by the donor, adapting them to 
concrete situations. For instance, competent and committed local organizations that 
have very few financial resources may have the cost-sharing requirement waived or 
drastically reduced. Riskier contexts or more problematic situations require the 
attributes to be used so as to minimize risk, or protect the project (and Sida) against it. 
Shorter project phases, greater involvement of Sida, greater emphasis on demand-
driven projects and competent local organizations, choice of Swedish consultants with 
an especially strong development orientation and a greater emphasis on learning and 
organization development are some of the ways in which this may be achieved.  In 
this way, and provided certain minimum conditions are met, it may not be so much a 
question of whether  but  how  CFTC can be used in certain contexts that differ 
significantly from the ‘usual’ ones. 
                                                 
10In many cases, this was the director or one of the executive directors of the local organization. 
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5.4  Co-ownership and incentives 
The concept of co-ownership introduced above was described as a special case 
of multiple ownership. Co-ownership is realized when the individual incentives facing 
the cooperating parties do not subtract from the overall success of the project but 
rather tend to reinforce each other. 
The aid practice observed of Sida in the projects reviewed of organizing the 
project as sequence of multiple short-term projects (phases) with a duration between 
one and two years, kept the aid provider clearly in the driving seat through the 
moments of evaluation and decision making on continuation. Both local organization 
and consultant required good results for further support. 
The consultants were always Swedish consultants, well known to Sida in 
terms of competence, commitment and skills. They have often worked with the 
agency before, and sometimes they depend on continued co-operation with Sida. 
When the local organization, the consultant and Sida enter into a contractual 
relation, the project’s organization into limited phases, both minimizes Sida’s risk 
and creates incentives for ownership and good performance, which ultimately 
translate into high ownership of knowledge outputs by the local organization (or by 
the intended beneficiaries, who sometimes are a different target group). 
Finally, from the point of view of its role as principal and the control it exerts 
over CFTC projects through the mechanisms of approval and evaluation of successive 
short phases, Sida is again strongly involved in the CFTC projects. Thus (i) the 
succession of small projects, (ii) the expectations or aims of local organizations and 
consultants concerning further Sida funded co-operation after the current project or 
phase ends, and (iii) the dependence of the approval of a new phase on good 
performance during the preceding one, give Sida a very strong position and a very 
important role in the process as a whole. The agency exercises considerable control 
over both the local organization and the consultant, despite not being a signatory to 
the contract. The aid provider can therefore be characterised as a ‘distant principal’, 
steering and controlling the project implementation process both through the contract 
itself and through the incentive system inherent in the approval of the successive 
phases in which most projects are organised. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that 
this role is played with a relatively small commitment of human resources on Sida’s 
part, because of the way in which the incentive system works on the local 
organization and the consultant alike. Given the joint interest in good performance, 
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the ‘direct principal’ of the contract could be either the consultant or the local 
organization, a true case of co-ownership. 
 
5.5  Relation between attributes of CFTC and Local Ownership 
As a summary of the logical relationship between the attributes of the aid 
modality and local ownership, Figure 2 below emphasizes that, at first, the attributes 
filter out and select project that are likely to have a high degree of local ownership. 
 
Figure 2 




















This is reinforced by the way the project is designed and influenced by the 
designing process. Finally during the implementation, the hands-off approach, the 
behavior of the local organization, the degree of commitment of the consultant and 
their joint interest in a positive evaluation influence the nature and depth of local 
ownership. Influences of aid attributes in previous stages continue to shape the field in 
next stages in interaction with other attributes. If there is a form of causation in this 
sequence, it is negative causation: wrong selection of local organizations and projects 
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as well differing agendas and high-handed involvement of aid provider and consultant 
all can lead to appropriation of the project and diminish local ownership. On the other 
hand, positively applied, these attributes can facilitate local ownership by limiting the 
negative aspects of the aid context. 
 
 
6  BROADENING THE DISCUSSION 
6.1 Introduction 
It is possible to draw from this study of ownership in CFTC projects a number 
of precepts more generally applicable both to the implementation to projects of co-
operation and their study, including even non-CFTC projects. In any co-operation 
initiative, and not only in CFTC, above all there are three requisites: to find and fund 
a reasonable balance of partner and donor responsibility, to achieve a balance of 
practice and theory, and to ensure successful project outcomes. 
 
6.2  Co-ownership more generally useful and relevant 
Perhaps the most important general finding of this study is that ownership 
does not have to be exclusively local. Whether the concept is applied to ownership of 
objectives, knowledge outputs or project processes, it is anyway a non-exclusive 
concept. Co-ownership then is not only possible but also positively desirable, since it 
ultimately reinforces local ownership. 
Co-ownership of knowledge in no way decreases the quality of that 
knowledge, or its actual or potential usefulness to those who have it. Co-ownership of 
objectives is not only a good basis for co-operation, it also has an effect of mutual 
reinforcement. A shared objective is a more strongly held objective as well. Co-
ownership of processes, i.e. shared responsibility for such processes, both eases the 
burden on all the parties involved and reinforces their ownership, and particularly the 
weaker party’s. It also, and most importantly, creates the conditions for the weaker 
party to assume responsibilities in line with its capabilities, and thus for the capacity-
development that donors everywhere see as one of their principal concerns. Finally, 
by stressing the element of solidarity between the parties involved, co-ownership of 
project processes helps cement their relations and provides a basis for broader, longer-
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term partnerships.
11 In this process, the consultant plays a crucial role. The 
development of partnerships, even around projects of limited duration, is certainly an 
important way of reaching that objective. 
 
6.3  Closer targeting of aid 
Another broad issue is that of closer targeting of aid in a climate in which aid 
administration will most likely have to become more efficient in dealing with aid 
flows given its dwindling administrative resources in relation to aid funds to be 
processed. 
This issue relates to the ways in which CFTC, through adroit application of its 
characteristics, tends to select only those partner organizations that are likely to ensure 
project success. While this is one aspect of ‘good targeting’ of assistance, there are of 
course others, such as targeting those who need it most. 
This study’s findings with regard to the former sense of targeting are that 
competent partners may be found not only in certain categories of countries, but 
wherever the necessary conditions, such as a committed project leadership, exist or 
can be developed. These requisites are not country-type-specific. National 
characteristics are far from being the main contextual considerations in this respect. 
Other factors, such as a slow or rapid start of new initiatives, levels of ownership, and 
the like, may be equally important. 
As regards the needs-assessment that an overall co-operation program aimed 
at close targeting must take account of, this study stresses the importance of strategic 
needs for organizational change and development. 
Besides the two concerns above, there are of course two more possibilities to 
ensure closer targeting: building on the proven strengths in the record of 
accomplishment of co-operation (CFTC and other) in the sectors concerned, and 
linking shorter run perspectives with longer together with informing the local 
organization of this fact. 
                                                 
11Solidarity will complement the usual business incentives for project success and will further facilitate 
knowledge transfer. 
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6.4  Reducing aid dependency 
A third broader issue concerns the aid dependency that remains even where a 
CFTC approach has been flexibly and pragmatically applied to result in expected 
project outcomes. Normally all donors strive for their efforts to have sustainable 
outcomes, enabling the eventual withdrawal of support. 
CFTC could contribute to reducing aid-dependency, for example through: 
•  Discussing and agreeing with the local organization, and  possibly also the 
consultant, on sustainability of results enabling a withdrawal of support as 
a shared goal and CFTC as an approach to achieve it; 
•  Actively seeking to increase the relevant information and access required 
by the local organization to strengthen its position to achieve this shared 
goal. 
 
6.5  ‘Matchmaker’ and other approaches to aid co-operation 
A fourth broader issue is that of the ideology of development co-operation. 
This concern arises because Sida, like any other donor, has both a ‘matchmaking’ 
responsibility to partnerships as well as an agenda of its own (for instance democracy 
and human rights in general and environmental and energy concerns in the Baltic 
specifically). In other words, there is almost always a tension in development co-
operation between the principles for ‘good co-operation’ in terms of local demand, 
local ownership and partnership, and the donor’s own agenda in other regards. 
Many would argue that both the donor and the recipient country gain from 
international development co-operation. They say that the aim of such co-operation 
should be to establish solidarity and good international relations as well as efficient 
aid targeting and delivery. Co-operation at large, but also CFTC, could better promote 
the values of mutuality by acknowledging that 
•  aid programs normally have multiple objectives, often of varying 
importance; 
•  it is unlikely that a single co-operation form can be expected to achieve all 
of these objectives; 
•  transparency around the fact that there are multiple objectives, often even 
for individual projects, has more to offer than obscurity or denial. 
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6.6  Linking means and ends in development co-operation 
Another broader issue, connected closely with the preceding one, has to do 
with the linking of means and ends in development co-operation, and the relation of 
the instruments through which aid is disbursed to the general policy objectives of the 
co-operation, including the particular objectives of certain co-operation forms such as 
CFTC. 
This broader issue arises from the fact as revealed by our research time and 
time again – to the general surprise of the donor – that CFTC means different things 
to different parties. Further, we found it not always to have local ownership as an 
explicit objective, despite ownership being a generally accepted objective of this 
modality perhaps above all as rehearsed in official policy documents. 
Donor agencies are sometimes criticized for being so wedded to certain forms 
of co-operation that they appear to be looking for problems to fit those forms. Putting 
the solution first in this way is like putting the cart before the horse. 
CFTC could be applied more purposefully than it is as present: 
•  if there were more explicit awareness on the part of its protagonists of its 
similarities with and differences from other forms of co-operation; 
•  if it were defined by its protagonists and participants not just through 
iteration of its individual characteristics, but also with reference to the 
common denominator of CFTC projects, and also to the differences 
between individual projects and that common denominator; and 
•  if it were therefore seen as having theoretical underpinnings, while at the 
same time remaining essentially a flexible form of co-operation. 
 
6.7  Aid, ethics and efficiency 
No donor or recipient is likely to disagree that aid should be ethical as well as 
efficient. However, there is much debate not only as to how, but even whether, ethics 
and efficiency can be combined. 
This broader issue arises from the study especially if ownership, whether local 
or joint, is seen as an ethical end which should be honored in itself, along with the 
sound technical and management work that is required to make worthwhile projects 
work. Much closer management of aid projects in the field by the aid provider could 
conceivably have some negative impact on local ownership and demand-driven aid. 
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Particularly ethical approaches to evaluations might be better achieved if they 
did not emphasize management efficiency at the expense of local ownership. It was 
indeed a finding of this study that normally local organizations were neither part nor 
full parties to CFTC evaluations in any serious sense, and that the criteria set for such 
evaluations make no reference to ownership and the like. 
An ethical ownership emphasis could be made broadly compatible with an 
efficiency perspective, for example through: 
•  being clear and explicit at the outset of CFTC projects regarding both 
ethical ends (such as local ownership) and cost-effectiveness; and 
•  including these ethical considerations explicitly in the terms of reference 
of CFTC evaluations, not least so that the role ethics plays in project 
performance and its management and outcomes can be attended to. 
 
6.8  The cultural context of aid characteristics 
Not explicitly explored in these case studies are the Swedish cultural 
(including moral and religious) constructions and values about co-operation, which 
may or not be shared with the local organizations. Yet, cost-sharing, besides being a 
practical token required by the aid provider for an applicant to be taken seriously, 
might also relate to a cultural concept of good order and rectitude. In other words, is 
cost sharing partly a practical proposition, and partly a matter of a moral duty? 
To answer such questions, further research would be required that, for 
instance, is specifically designed to inquire into such cultural (and moral, religious 
and political) dimensions, including its methodology and nature of discourse; 
compares aid with non-aid issues in public affairs (and foreign relations); goes beyond 
even CFTC and non CFTC comparisons; and compares the Swedish cultures of co-
operation with those of the partner countries. 
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